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Abstract The Russian doping scandal that rocked the
sporting world during the past 2 years is far from over. The
World Anti-Doping Agency is still in turmoil over its total
failure to discover the Russian doping scheme and the
International Olympic Committee and other Sports
Governing Bodies are still struggling to find the appropri-
ate response to Russia’s total disregard of the spirit and
letter of the World Anti-Doping Code. Yet the recent
publications of a string of awards related to the scandal by
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) provides us with
the opportunity to offer some preliminary reflections on the
role of the CAS in dealing with the consequences of the
scandal for the world anti-doping system at large. This
article will analyse the relevant CAS awards in a chrono-
logical order. It will start with the ‘IAAF Award’, before
turning to the awards rendered by the CAS ad hoc Division
in Rio, and finishing with the ‘IPC award’. The modest
ambition of this paper is to retrace the reasoning used by
the CAS panels and to analyse its broader consequences for
the practical operation of the world anti-doping system.
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1 Introduction
The Russian doping scandal that rocked the sporting world
during the past 2 years is far from over. The World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA) is still in turmoil over its failure to
discover the Russian doping scheme and the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) and other Sports Governing
Bodies (SGBs) are still struggling to find the appropriate
response to Russia’s disregard of the spirit and letter of the
World Anti-Doping Code (WADC). Yet the recent publi-
cations of a string of awards related to the scandal by the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) provide us with the
opportunity to offer some preliminary reflections on the role
of the CAS in dealing with the consequences of the scandal
for the world anti-doping system at large.
Since December 2014, and the broadcasting of an
alarming documentary by the German public broadcaster,1
much happened. The documentary triggered the Pound
investigation financed by the WADA,2 which led to two
damaging reports for the Russian anti-doping system and
the International Association of Athletics Federations
(IAAF).3 Yet, this was only the beginning. Shortly after,
the former head of Moscow’s anti-doping laboratory
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1 H. Seppelt, The secrets of doping: How Russia makes winners,
ARD, Youtube, 27 April 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
iu9B-ty9JCY. Accessed 25 January 2017.
2 WADA announces details of independent commission, WADA
Press release, 16 December 2014. https://www.wada-ama.org/en/
media/news/2014-12/wada-announces-details-of-independent-com
mission. Accessed 25 January 2017.
3 WADA Independent Commission Report #1, 9 November 2015.
https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/world-anti-doping-program/
independent-commission-report-1. Accessed 25 January 2017, and
WADA Independent Commission Report #2, 14 January 2016.
https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/world-anti-doping-program/
independent-commission-report-2. Accessed 25 January 2017.
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provided a detailed sketch to the New York Times of the
operation of a general state-led doping scheme in Russia.4
The system was designed to avert any positive doping tests
for top-level Russian sportspeople and was going far
beyond athletics. These allegations were later largely
confirmed and reinforced by the McLaren investigation
initiated by WADA in May 2016,5 and which led to the
publication of a first report in July 2016 shortly before the
Rio Olympics.6 The second and final report of the McLaren
investigation was released in December 2016.7 Based on
this influx of information and investigations, the facts are
relatively straightforward: the Russian state organized a
fail-proof system to protect ‘its’ athletes from failing anti-
doping tests. Thus, as the IOC’s litany of retroactive
decisions sanctioning Russian Olympic medallists for past
anti-doping violations demonstrate, it secured the success
of its athletes in recent Olympiads. The revelation of such a
sophisticated state-led system to circumvent the world anti-
doping system could not be left unsanctioned. Otherwise,
the WADC would be deprived of the little efficacy it had
left. Hence, the IAAF, first, and subsequently the IOC
(even though in an indirect fashion as will be explained in
section II) and the International Paralympic Committee
(IPC) issued sanctions against their Russian members and,
thus, indirectly also against Russian athletes.
The IAAF quickly suspended the Russian Athletics
Federation in November 2015 and declared its athletes
ineligible for IAAF competitions. This controversial deci-
sion was later confirmed in June 2016 before the Rio
Olympics, and barred Russian athletes access to the
Olympic Games. The IAAF did, however, foresee a narrow
exception for Russian athletes able to show that they were
properly tested outside of Russia. Nonetheless, the athletes
using this exception were to compete under a neutral flag at
the Olympics. Unsurprisingly, Russian athletes led by pole
superstar (and now IOC member), Yelena Isinbayeva, and
the Russian Olympic Committee decided to challenge this
decision in front of the CAS. Unlike the IAAF, the IOC’s
decided not to decide on 24 July 2016 and, instead, granted
to the International Federations (IFs) the competence to
determine whether each Russian athlete put forward by the
Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) to participate in the
Olympics meets a limited set of conditions.8 Moreover, the
ROC was also barred from entering athletes who were
sanctioned for doping in the past, even if they have already
served their doping sanction. In the end, a majority of the
Russian athletes (278 out of 389 submitted by the ROC9)
cleared the IOC’s bar relatively easily. However, this also
meant that a considerable number of Russian athletes (111)
did not fulfil the IOC’s conditions, leading many of them to
fight for their right to compete at the Rio Olympics before
the CAS ad hoc Division.10
Finally, on 22 July, the IPC decided to open suspension
proceedings against the National Paralympic Committee of
Russia (NPC Russia) in light of its apparent inability to
fulfil its IPC membership responsibilities and obligations.11
A few weeks later, on 7 August, the IPC Governing Board
decided to suspend the Russian Paralympic Committee
with immediate effect.12 Consequently, the Russian Para-
lympic Committee lost all rights and privileges of IPC
membership. Specifically, it was not entitled to enter ath-
letes in competitions sanctioned by the IPC, and/or to
participate in IPC activities. This was an obvious blow to
Russia’s Paralympic team and, as was to be expected, the
RPC decided to challenge the decision at the CAS.
Thereafter, the CAS became the central legal playing field
where the cases involving decisions of the SGBs due to the
Russian doping scandal were challenged and fought on.13
Henceforth, it also had the future shape of the world anti-
doping system in its hands. Would it favour the right of
4 Rebecca R. Ruiz and Michael Schwirtz, Russian Insider Says State-
Run Doping Fueled Olympic Gold, New York Times, 12 May 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olym
pics-2014.html. Accessed 25 January 2017.
5 WADA publishes Terms of Reference for Independent Person








7 McLaren Independent Investigation Report – Part II, 9 December
2016. https://www.wada-ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/
mclaren_report_part_ii_2.pdf. Accessed 25 January 2017.
8 Decision of the IOC Executive Board Concerning the Participation
of Russian Athletes in the Olympic Games Rio 2016, IOC Press
Release, 24 July 2016. https://www.olympic.org/news/decision-of-
the-ioc-executive-board-concerning-the-participation-of-russian-ath
letes-in-the-olympic-games-rio-2016. Accessed 25 January 2017.
9 See Wikipedia, Russia at the 2016 Summer Olympics. https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia_at_the_2016_Summer_Olympics. Acces-
sed 25 January 2017.
10 In general on the role of the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Olympic
selection dispute see Duval (2016a), pp 52–66.
11 The IPC opens suspension proceedings against NPC Russia, IPC
Press Release, 22 July 2016. https://www.paralympic.org/news/ipc-
opens-suspension-proceedings-against-npc-russia. Accessed 25 Jan-
uary 2017.
12 The IPC suspends theRussianParalympicCommitteewith immediate
effect, IPC Press Release, 7 August 2016, https://www.paralympic.org/
news/ipc-suspends-russian-paralympic-committee-immediate-effect.
Accessed 25 January 2017.
13 Additionally to the cases reviewed here, the CAS is also dealing
with cases involving specific individuals, such as the former head of
the Russian federation, Valentin Balakhnichev, and the son of the
former head of the IAAF, Papa Massata Diack. At the time of writing,
it had not yet rendered its awards.
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athletes to participate in the Olympics, and thus, weaken the
effectiveness of the sanctions issuedby the SGBs, and through
them of the WADC? Or would it choose to uphold the sanc-
tions, and risk depriving innocent Russian athletes from the
once-in-a-life-time chance to shine at the Olympics? There is
no easy answer to this delicate balancing exercise, and the
CASwas up for a series of hard cases, which would define the
operation of the world anti-doping system for years to come.
In the end, as this article will show, the CAS sided with the
tough stance adopted by some SGBs and decided that shoring
up the world anti-doping systemwas worth depriving some of
the Russian athletes from their Rio perch.
This article will analyse the CAS awards in a chrono-
logical order. It will start with the ‘IAAF Award’,14 before
turning to the awards rendered by the CAS ad hoc Division
in Rio,15 and finishing with the ‘IPC award’.16 The modest
ambition of this paper is to retrace the reasoning used by
the CAS panels and to analyse its broader consequences for
the practical operation of the world anti-doping system.
2 The ‘IAAF Award’
2.1 From the ARD documentary to the ineligibility
of Russian athletes for the Rio Olympics
The IAAF started acting upon the suspicions of doping in
Russian athletics only after the publication of the first Pound
report on 9 November 2015. In its first press release after the
publication of the report, the president of the IAAF, Sebastian
Coe, announced that he had ‘‘taken the urgent step of seeking
approval from his fellow IAAF Council Members to consider
sanctions against the Russian Athletics Federation
(ARAF).’’17 He was considering ‘‘provisional and full
suspension and the removal of future IAAF events.’’ This
announcement was quickly followed on 13 November 2015
with the provisional suspension of the ARAF by the Council
of the IAAF.18 Consequently, Russian athletes and athlete
support personnel were banned from competing in interna-
tional competitions including World Athletics Series com-
petitions and the Olympic Games. Furthermore, Russia lost
the right to host the 2016 World Race Walking Team
Championships (Cheboksary) and 2016 World Junior
Championships (Kazan), while ARAF were to delegate the
conduct of all outstanding doping cases to the CAS. The
provisory ban was based on IAAF Constitution Article
6.11(b) and Article 14.7. The ARAF could have challenged
the decision of the Council but declined to do so and accepted
the sanctions.19 Simultaneously, the decision also included a
specific procedure for RusAF (former ARAF) to regain IAAF
membership. It foresaw that an inspection team led by an
Independent Chair, Rune Andersen, would verify whether
RusAF complies with a long list of precise criteria.20
In early 2016, the IAAF taskforce started its verifications
based on the aforementioned criteria. In March 2016, after its
first visit to Moscow in January, the taskforce considered that
‘‘the Russian delegates have made significant progress
towards meetingmany of the Verification Criteria established
by IAAF Council.’’21 Yet, it also added that ‘‘there is signif-
icant work still to be done to satisfy the Reinstatement Con-
ditions and so RusAF should not be reinstated to membership
at this stage.’’ However, after the revelations of the New York
Times in May 2016, the IAAF taskforce recommended that
‘‘RusAF should not be reinstated to membership at this stage,
because several important Verification Criteria have not been
met.’’22 The taskforce considered the following:
• The deep-seated culture of tolerance (or worse) for
doping that led to RusAF being suspended in the first
place appears not to have changed materially to date.
14 CAS 2016/O/4684, The Russian Olympic Committee (‘‘ROC’’)
et al. v. The International Association of Athletics Federations
(IAAF), Award of 21 July 2016.
15 The following awards are reviewed: CAS OG 16/13, Anastasia
Karabelshikova & Ivan Podshivalov v. FISA & IOC, Award of 4
August 2016; CAS OG 16/04, Yulia Efimova v. ROC, IOC & FINA,
Award of 4 August 2016; CAS OG 16/09, RWF v. IWF, Award of 3
August 2016; CAS OG 16/11, Daniil Andrienko et al. v. FISA & IOC,
Award of 2 August 2016; CAS OG 16/18, Kiril Sveshnikov et al. v.
UCI & IOC, Award of 5 August 2016; CAS OG 16/19, Natalia
Podolskaya & Alexander Dyachenko v. ICF, Award of 7 August
2016; CAS OG 16/12, Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC, Award of 4
August 2016; CAS OG 16/21, Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovash-
kov v. ICF & RCF, Award of 7 August 2016; CAS OG 16/24, Darya
Klishina v. IAAF, Award of 15 August 2016.
16 CAS 2016/A/4745, Russian Paralympic Committee v. Interna-
tional Paralympic Committee, award of 23 August 2016.
17 IAAF Statement – WADA’s Independent Commission Report,
IAAF Press Release, 9 November 2015. https://www.iaaf.org/news/
press-release/statement-wada-independent-commission-report. Acces-
sed 25 January 2017.
18 IAAF Provisionally Suspends Russian Member Federation ARAF,
IAAF Press Release, 13 November 2015. https://www.iaaf.org/news/
press-release/iaaf-araf-suspended. Accessed 25 January 2017.
19 ARAF Accepts Full suspension – IAAF Council Meeting,
Monaco, IAAF Press Release, 26 November 2015. https://www.iaaf.
org/news/press-release/araf-accepts-full-suspension. Accessed 25
January 2017.
20 ARAF Reinstatement Conditions and Verification Criteria, IAAF
Press Release, 11 December 2015. https://www.iaaf.org/news/press-
release/araf-reinstatement-verification-criteria. Accessed 25 January
2017.
21 Council Focuses on IAAF Reform and Russian Verification –
IAAF Council Meeting, Day 2, IAAF Press Release, 11 March 2016.
https://www.iaaf.org/news/iaaf-news/council-meeting-2016-reforms-
russia. Accessed 25 January 2017.
22 ‘RusAF Has Not Met Reinstatement Conditions’ – IAAF Council
Meeting, Vienna, IAAF Press Release, 17 June 2016. https://www.
iaaf.org/news/press-release/iaaf-council-meeting-vienna. Accessed 25
January 2017.
Int Sports Law J
123
• A strong and effective anti-doping infrastructure capable
ofdetectinganddeterringdopinghas still not beencreated.
• There are detailed allegations, which are already partly
substantiated, that the Russian authorities, far from
supporting the anti-doping effort, have in fact orches-
trated systematic doping and the covering up of adverse
analytical findings.
This meant ‘‘that Russian athletes remain[ed] ineligible
under IAAF Rules to compete in International Competitions
including the European Championships and the Rio 2016
Olympic Games.’’ The taskforce also recommended that
RusAF remains suspended, i.e. that no ‘‘representatives of
RusAF (i.e. officials, athlete support personnel, etc.) should
take part in International Competition or in the affairs of the
IAAF.’’ The IAAF Council unanimously endorsed the rec-
ommendations. At the same meeting, and also upon recom-
mendation of the taskforce, the IAAF Council passed a rule
amendment ‘‘to the effect that if there are any individual
athletes who can clearly and convincingly show that they are
not tainted by the Russian system because they have been
outside the country, and subject to other, effective anti-
doping systems, including effective drug testing, then they
should be able to apply for permission to compete in Inter-
national Competitions, not for Russia but as a neutral ath-
lete.’’ These changes were introduced in Rule 22.1A IAAF
Competition Rules (Rule 22.1A).23 Finally, the IAAF also
decided to let Yuliya Stepanova, the ARD whistle-blower,
compete due to her ‘‘extraordinary contribution to the fight
against doping in sport.’’
On 23 June, the IAAF published a set of guidelines on
the basis of which Russian athletes could request a per-
mission to compete in IAAF events (and the Olympics) if
they could demonstrate not being tainted by the Russian
state-doping system as provided under the exception
enshrined in Rule 22.1A.24 However, athletes using this
exception would be allowed to compete only as neutral
athletes. Stepanova was the first athlete authorized to
compete at the Rio Games by the IAAF (ironically, she
would later be blocked by the IOC) based on the rule
22.1A.25 She was joined only by Darya Klishina (the IAAF
later rescinded this eligibility in light of her involvement in
the McLaren Report, but, as will be explained in greater
details in section II, the CAS ad hoc division decided
against all odds to let her compete in Rio).26
The IAAF felt comforted in its decisions by the release
of the McLaren Report on 18 July.27 Yet, the Russian
athletes and the Russian Olympic Committee were obvi-
ously extremely dissatisfied with this outcome. Both sides
agreed to submit the matter, through the ordinary arbitral
procedure, to the CAS, which held a quick hearing on 19
July.28
2.2 The key legal questions at the CAS
While the decision to reject the demands of the Russian
athletes was publicized immediately (on 21 July) on the
CAS’ website,29 it was not until 3 months later that the full
text of the award was made publicly available. For ana-
lytical purposes, and following the award’s internal
23 Rule 22.1A IAAF Competition Rules reads as follows:
1A. Notwithstanding Rule 22.1(a), upon application, the Council
(or its delegate(s)) may exceptionally grant eligibility for some or all
International Competitions, under conditions defined by the Council
(or its delegate(s)), to an athlete whose National Federation is
currently suspended by the IAAF, if (and only if) the athlete is able to
demonstrate to the comfortable satisfaction of the Council that:
(a) the suspension of the National Federation was not due in any
way to its failure to protect and promote clean athletes, fair play, and
the integrity and authenticity of the sport; or
(b) if the suspension of the National Federation was due in any
way to its failure to put in place adequate systems to protect and
promote clean athletes, fair play, and the integrity and authenticity of
the sport, (i) that failure does not affect or taint the athlete in any way,
because he was subject to other, fully adequate, systems outside of the
country of the National Federation for a sufficiently long period to
provide substantial objective assurance of integrity; and (ii) in
particular the athlete has for such period been subject to fully
compliant drug testing in- and out-of-competition equivalent in
quality to the testing to which his competitors in the International
Competition(s) in question are subject; or
(c) that the athlete has made a truly exceptional contribution to the
protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play, and the integrity
and authenticity of the sport.
The more important the International Competition in question, the
more corroborating evidence the athlete must provide in order to be
granted special eligibility under this Rule 22.1A. Where such
eligibility is granted, the athlete shall not represent the suspended
National Federation in the International Competition(s) in question,
but rather shall compete in an individual capacity, as a ’Neutral
Athlete’.
24 Guidelines for applications under Competition Rule 22.1A, 23
June 2016. http://www.iaaf.org/download/download?filename=12361
1d5-208d-45b3-a34e-69d02554b44f.pdf&urlSlug=guidelines-for-
applications-under-competition. Accessed 25 January 2017.
25 Stepanova Eligible to Compete Internationally as an Independent
Neutral Athlete, IAAF Press Release, 1 July 2016. https://www.iaaf.
org/news/press-release/independent-neutral-athlete. Accessed 25
January 2017.
26 Darya Klishina eligible to compete internationally as an indepen-
dent neutral athlete, IAAF Press release, 9 July 2016. https://www.
iaaf.org/news/press-release/darya-klishina-eligible-independent-neutral-
r. Accessed 25 January 2017.
27 IAAF Response to McLaren Report, IAAF Press Release, 18 July
2016. https://www.iaaf.org/news/press-release/iaaf-response-mclaren-
report. Accessed 25 January 2017.
28 IAAF President Sebastian Coe Attends CAS Hearings, IAAF Press
Release, 19 July 2016. https://www.iaaf.org/news/press-release/sebas
tian-coe-cas-hearing-rusaf. Accessed 25 January 2017.
29 The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Rejects the Claims/
Appeal of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) and of 68 Russian
Athletes, 21 July 2016. http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
Media_Release_4684_210716.pdf. Accessed 25 January 2017.
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structure, this article will deal with the following four
questions raised:
• Does the suspension of the RusAF extend to the
eligibility of the Russian athletes?
• Is the new IAAF rule 22.1.A a sanction?
• Can the ROC nominate athletes to the Olympic Games
without the assent of the IAAF?
• Will the Russian athletes falling under rule 22.1.A
compete as neutral athletes in Rio?
2.2.1 Does the suspension of the RusAF under Rule
22.1(a) extend to the eligibility of the Russian
athletes?
The Russian athletes challenged first the application by
IAAF of Rule 22.1(a) IAAF Competition rules.30 The Rule
provides for the IAAF-wide ineligibility of ‘‘[a]ny athlete,
athlete support personnel or other person whose National
Federation is currently suspended by the IAAF.’’ In other
words, the claimants ‘‘want an exception to the rule for
doping cases, so that the ineligibility for the athletes
affiliated to a suspended national federation, a member of
the IAAF, would not apply if the suspension is imposed for
the federation’s failure to ensure an effective doping con-
trol system.’’31
2.2.1.1 Rule 22.1(a) is a valid rule extending the ineligi-
bility of a federation to its athletes The Panel rejected
this challenge. First, it considered that it was not its duty to
rewrite the IAAF’s rules. Instead, the ‘‘rule- making power,
and the balance to be struck in its exercise between the
competing interests involved, is conferred on the compe-
tent bodies of the sport entity, which shall exercise it taking
into account also the overall legislative framework.’’32
Second, it highlighted ‘‘that the suspension of the Russian
track and field federation is not disputed in this arbitra-
tion.’’33 This is due to the fact that ARAF did not contest
the original decision of IAAF in November 2015. Conse-
quently, ‘‘the dispute heard by the Panel regards only the
consequences for the athletes affiliated to the Russian
federation of the suspension imposed on their federation
and not the reasons for the suspension.’’34 Thirdly, the
Panel rejected the view that Rule 22.1(a) is a doping
sanction. Rather, ‘‘it is a rule which affects the eligibility of
athletes to enter into International Competitions and is a
consequence of the organizational structure of international
sport; national federations are members of international
federations, and have the duty to respect the obligations
deriving from such membership; athletes participate in
organized sport, as controlled by an international federa-
tion, only on the basis of their registration with a national
federation, which is a member of the international federa-
tion in question.’’35 Thus, ‘‘Rule 22.1(a) is a rule of general
application, not specific to doping cases, and would apply
equally to athletes who are members of federations that fail
to pay their membership dues as to athletes who are
members of federations that engage in other breaches of
federation obligations to the IAAF as a member thereof.’’36
The claimants sought to frame Rule 22.1(a) and Rule
22.1A as a package applying specifically to anti-doping
cases. The Panel highlighted instead that ‘‘Rule 22.1(a) is
not part of a new package of rules’’, as it ‘‘has existed since
at least 2000, whereas Rule 22.1A is a recent amend-
ment.’’37 It saw Rule 22.1(a) as ‘‘a necessary consequence
of the sanction imposed on RusAF.’’38 In sum, the ‘‘ath-
letes are ineligible because RusAF has been sanctioned,
and accepted that sanction, not because of what the athletes
have done.’’39
2.2.1.2 Rule 22.1(a) is not contrary to the World Anti-
Doping Code The Panel also rejected the argument that
Rule 22.1(a) would be contrary to the WADC. First,
because it is not an additional doping sanction (and
therefore is not covered by the Osaka rule jurisprudence of
the CAS40) and second because it is consistent with the
WADC’s mandate to international federations to introduce
sanctions in case their members do not comply with the
Code.41 Furthermore, ‘‘it is a fundamental principle of the
law of associations in all applicable jurisdictions that
members of associations have an obligation to satisfy the
requirements for membership in the association and if they
fail to do so those members may have their association
membership adversely affected.’’42 The Panel therefore
refused to ‘‘disturb these well-accepted principles.’’43
30 Rule 22.1(a) IAAF Competition rules.
31 CAS 2016/O/4684, The Russian Olympic Committee (‘‘ROC’’)
et al v. The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF),




35 Ibid., para. 119.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., para. 120.
38 Ibid., para. 121.
39 Ibid.
40 CAS 2011/O/2422, United States Olympic Committee (USOC) v.
International Olympic Committee (IOC), Award of 4 October 2011.
41 CAS 2016/O/4684, The Russian Olympic Committee (‘‘ROC’’)
et al v. The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF),
Award of 21 July 2016, paras. 122-124.
42 Ibid, para. 124.
43 Ibid.
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2.2.1.3 IAAF is not estopped to enforce Rule 22.1(a) on the
Russian athletes The Panel further refused to find that the
IAAF was estopped from considering the Russian athletes
ineligible based on Rule 22.1(a).44 Even though it is pos-
sible that some IAAF employees/executives were involved
in a corruption scheme to cover-up doping cases, ‘‘[t]here
is no suggestion that the IAAF officials were involved in
the systemic doping of Russian athletes.’’45 Moreover,
‘‘none of the Claimant Athletes has argued that they knew
about the IAAF’s wrongdoing and relied on it to their
detriment, or that they believed that RusAF would not be
suspended in the event of misconduct.’’46 The arbitrators
also deny that the Rule 22.1(a) was too imprecise. In par-
ticular, the fact that the length of the ineligibility is inde-
terminate is deemed a ‘‘simple consequence of the fact that
it is contingent on the National Federation (‘‘NF’’) being
reinstated.’’47
2.2.1.4 The ineligibility of Russian athletes under Rule
22.1(a) is proportionate With the Panel considering that
‘‘Rule 22.1(a) is not a sanction’’, it therefore ‘‘does not
have to pass any test of proportionality.’’48 The Panel
nonetheless decided to engage in a very interesting exercise
to assess its putative proportionality. It found ‘‘that the
effect (ineligibility to compete at International Competi-
tions) on the athletes registered with a national federation
suspended by IAAF is a proportionate consequence of the
national federation’s suspension for its failure to put in
place an adequate system to protect and promote clean
athletes, fair play and integrity of sport.’’49 In the view of
the arbitrators, ‘‘eradication of doping in sport, protection
and promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity are
undeniably legitimate objectives of extreme importance for
the viability of sport at any level.’’50 In this regard, ‘‘the
measure taken by IAAF, and the effect it produces, is
capable of achieving those objectives, as it prevents ath-
letes under the jurisdiction of the suspended national fed-
eration (for having failed to promote a doping-free
environment) from competing with athletes registered with
federations that have not been the subject of an exclu-
sion.’’51 Furthermore, ‘‘the measure taken by IAAF is
necessary to reach the envisaged goal: if the IAAF could
not take a step having the mentioned effect, the suspension
of the Russian federation would have no meaningful
impact.’’52 Thus, ‘‘the constraints which the affected ath-
letes, including the Claimant Athletes, will suffer as a
consequence of the measure are justified by the overall
interest to achieve the envisaged goal, which outweighs
them, and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
it.’’53 Finally, the Panel highlighted the role played by Rule
22.1A. This provisions evidenced ‘‘that the effect produced
by the suspension of a national federation (in force since at
least 2000) was recently made more flexible, to take into
account individual cases, in a way consistent with the
sought purpose of eradication of doping, protection and
promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity.’’54
In conclusion, the Panel held ‘‘that IAAF Competition
Rule 22.1(a) is valid and enforceable in the circumstances
of the present dispute.’’55
2.2.2 Is IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A valid
and enforceable in the circumstances of the present
dispute?
The claimants were also challenging the validity of Rule
22.1A, as they were constructing the rule as an unfore-
seeable sanction against athletes who would not comply
with the requirements enshrined in it. Yet, the Panel
questioned the ‘‘interest the Claimants would have in see-
ing it set aside, given that it is a rule which allows athletes
to be included, not excluded.’’56 Indeed, if the Panel were
to strike struck down Rule 22.1A, ‘‘the only consequence
for the Claimants would be that any athlete who made him/
herself eligible pursuant to Rule 22.1A would still be
ineligible: the Claimant Athletes, on the other hand, would
not regain the eligibility denied by Rule 22.1(a).’’57 The
claimants argued that both rules were intimately connected
and amounted to one sanction: if one would be deemed
invalid the other would fall too.58 However, the Panel
noted in response to this argument ‘‘that (i) the legality of
Rule 22.1(a) and its applicability in the present circum-
stances has already been confirmed, as per the considera-
tions above, [and] (ii) the Claimants’ submissions as to the
legality of Rule 22.1A have no merit […].’’59 Thus, the
Panel found Rule 22.1.A not to be inconsistent with the
WADC as it did not constitute a sanction. Similarly, not
being a sanction, its proportionality was not in question,
nor did it appear to be a discriminatory rule. The athletes
44 Ibid., paras. 125–127.
45 Ibid., para. 126.
46 Ibid., para. 127.
47 Ibid., para. 128.
48 Ibid., para. 129.
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could not rely on any legitimate expectations to be eligible
if they met the Verification Criteria published on 11
December 2015, as ‘‘they would have also known that
RusAF would have to be reinstated before they became
eligible.’’60 Indeed, ‘‘Rule 22.1A did not change the way in
which the Claimant Athletes could make themselves eli-
gible’’, instead ‘‘it provided another route to eligibility, one
which could be pursued even though RusAF had not been
reinstated in accordance with the Reinstatement
Conditions.’’61
In the end, the Panel only criticized the lack of legal
certainty provided by Rule 22.1A(b), ‘‘as its terms may
appear vague and retroactive in nature.’’62 Nonetheless,
‘‘this does not help the Claimants in having the application
of this rule set aside in the given case.’’63 Even if
‘‘retroactive criteria in general are to be avoided as unfair
and contrary to fundamental notions of due process and
good sportsmanship, […] Rule 22.1A is an inclusionary
rule, and only created an opportunity, not a bar, for the
Claimant Athletes.’’64 Hence, not applying it ‘‘would only
have the effect of harming any other Russian athlete who
satisfied Rule 22.1A(b).’’65
2.2.3 Can the ROC nominate athletes to the Olympic
Games without the assent of the IAAF?
The third question raised by the claimants was whether the
ROC could bypass the IAAF’s decision and nominate
athletes without its approval to participate in the Rio
Olympics. Here again the Panel from the outset found
‘‘that, under the Olympic Charter, the ROC is not entitled
to nominate athletes who are not eligible under IAAF
Competition Rules 22.1(a) and 22.1A.’’66 In order to come
to this conclusion, the Panel focused on the Olympic
Charter. It noted that ‘‘Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter
restricts participation in the Olympic Games to those who
comply with the Olympic Charter and the WADC,
including the conditions of participation established by the
IOC, ‘‘as well as the rules of the relevant IF as approved by
the IOC’’.’’67 Moreover, it interpreted the latter sentence as
implying ‘‘mandatory compliance with IF rules.’’68 The
Panel found that ‘‘the Olympic Charter makes it clear that
an NOC shall only enter competitors upon the
recommendations for entries given by national federations
(Rule 44.4), and that as a condition precedent to partici-
pation in the Olympic Games every competitor has to
comply not only with the provisions of the Olympic
Charter, but also with ‘‘the rules of the IF governing his
sport’’ (Bye-law 4 to Rule 44).’’69 It concluded that ‘‘the
NOCs can only exercise their right to send personnel to the
Olympic Games if they comply with the rules of the rele-
vant International Federation (‘‘IF’’) because otherwise
they would be contravening Rule 40 of the Olympic
Charter.’’70 Consequently, ‘‘ROC cannot enter into the
2016 Olympic Games athletes who do not comply with the
IAAF’s rules, including those athletes who are not eligible
under Competition Rules 22.1(a) and 22.1A.’’71 Even in the
unlikely event, RusAF is deemed not to exist anymore for
the purpose of the application of the Olympic Charter, and
Bye-law 5 to Rule 4472 of the Olympic Charter is deemed
applicable, ‘‘the ROC would need the IAAF’s, and IOC
Executive Board’s, approval to send competitors.’’73
Therefore, with or without RusAF, ‘‘the ROC cannot enter
athletes who are ineligible pursuant to the IAAF’s rules.’’74
2.2.4 Will the Russian athletes enjoying the exception
enshrined in Rule 22.1A compete as neutral athletes?
Finally, the last interrogation posed by the claimants con-
cerns the Russian athletes regaining eligibility through
Rule 22.1.A and whether they could compete as repre-
sentatives of Russia. Incidentally, this is the only point on
which the claimants are found by the Panel to prevail.
Indeed, it held ‘‘that, under the Olympic Charter, if there
are any Russian track and field athletes who are eligible to
compete at the 2016 Olympic Games under IAAF Com-
petition Rule 22.1A, the ROC is entitled to enter them to
compete as representatives of Russia.’’75 In its view, ‘‘un-
der the Olympic Charter it is not for an IF to determine
whether an athlete, eligible for entry to the Olympic
Games, has to compete as a ‘‘neutral’’ athlete, or as an
athlete representing the NOC that entered him or her.’’76 In
60 Ibid., para. 151.
61 Ibid., para. 152.
62 Ibid., para. 143.
63 Ibid., para. 146.
64 Ibid., paras. 146 and 147.
65 Ibid, para. 147.
66 Ibid., para. 155.
67 Ibid., para. 157.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., para. 158.
70 Ibid., para. 159.
71 Ibid., para. 161.
72 Bye-law 5 to Rule 44 reads as follows: ‘‘Should there be no
national federation for a particular sport in a country which has a
recognised NOC, the latter may enter competitors individually in such
sport in the Olympic Games subject to the approval of the IOC
Executive Board and the IF governing such sport.’’
73 CAS 2016/O/4684, The Russian Olympic Committee (‘‘ROC’’)
et al v. The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF),
Award of 21 July 2016, para. 164.
74 Ibid., para. 165.
75 Ibid., para. 167.
76 Ibid., para. 168.
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other words, ‘‘athletes which are sent to the Olympic
Games are not entered as neutrals, but are sent by an
NOC.’’77 Moreover, ‘‘an athlete does not represent his/her
national federation; the federation’s suspension does not
prevent an athlete from being entered into the Olympic
Games as a representative of his/her NOC.’’78
The Panel did recognize, however, the fact ‘‘that the
ROC is entitled, under the Olympic Charter, to enter into
the Olympic Games as representatives of Russia any
Russian track and field athletes who are eligible to compete
under IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A does not mean that
the IOC is bound to accept such designation as athletes
representing Russia.’’79 In sum, it was not IAAF’s com-
petence to declare the athletes as neutral but the IOC’s, and
it declined to do so in practice.
Hence, unlike the IOC, which has shown little will-
ingness to seriously crack down on Russia after the
scandal, the IAAF has adopted a tough line. It sidelined
Russia’s athletics federation as soon as the suspicions
voiced by whistle-blowers were substantiated and
refused to let Russian athletes participate in the Rio
Olympics, thus reinforcing the anti-doping fight with a
symbolically important sanction. Indeed, the world anti-
doping system will remain a paper tiger if Russia’s
systematic breach of anti-doping rules and spirit is not
followed by truly deterrent sanctions. Surely, the system
as a whole deserves a comprehensive reform addressing
the massive deficiencies highlighted by the Russian
scandal.
3 The Russian doping scandal at the CAS ad hoc
Division
Since it was first introduced at the Atlanta Games in
1996,80 the CAS ad hoc Division has never been as
crowded as it was during this year’s Rio Olympics. This is
mainly due to the Russian doping scandal, which has
fuelled the CAS with Russian athletes challenging their
ineligibility to compete at the Games. The CAS statistics
show that out of 28 ad hoc awards rendered, 16 involved
Russian athletes challenging their ineligibility. The fol-
lowing section will provide an analysis of the ten CAS
awards related to Russian athletes.81
3.1 The Efimova case: saved by the Osaka de´ja`-vu
Yulia Efimova, a top-level Russian swimmer, had a diffi-
cult time in Rio as her peers and the press heavily criticized
her. Yet, as a sweet revenge, she did win two silver medals.
Her achievement was made possible by a decision of the
CAS ad hoc Division that enabled her to compete, although
she had been sanctioned previously for doping and fell
under paragraph 3 of the IOC Decision.82 In principle,
Efimova, like the rowers Anastasia Karabelshikova and
Ivan Podshivalov, did not comply with the criteria imposed
by the IOC. However, in two separate awards, the CAS
Panels, relying primarily on the concept of ‘natural justice’
and referring to the established CAS jurisprudence
regarding the so-called ‘Osaka rule’,83 sided with the
Russian athletes against the IOC. The ‘Osaka rule’, which
was adopted by the IOC in June 2008 in Osaka, foresaw
that any person sanctioned with a doping ban of more than
6 months would be ineligible for the Olympic Games fol-
lowing the date of expiry of the ban. In 2011, the CAS
found that rule to be contrary to the WADC and the IOC’s
Olympic Charter.84
In both awards, the CAS ad hoc Division clearly iden-
tified that the ‘‘issues before the Panel focused primarily
upon the legality of paragraph 3 of the IOC Decision.’’85
The arbitrators emphasized that the IOC had acted in
‘‘good faith and with the best intentions’’86 in addressing
the release of the IP Report. However, the Panels also
stressed that the IOC Decision recognised the ‘‘right of the
individual athletes to natural justice.’’87 In this regard, both
Panels challenged the legality of paragraph 3 of the IOC
Decision. Thus, it is argued that this paragraph ‘‘contains
simple, unqualified and absolute criterion.’’88 Furthermore,
‘‘there is no recourse for such an athlete, no criteria that
considers the promotion by the athlete of clean athletics (as
the IAAF consider by way of an example) or any other
criteria at all.’’89 Therefore, the arbitrators struggled ‘‘to
77 Ibid., para. 170.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 On the first years of the CAS Ad Hoc Division, see Kaufmann-
Kohler (2001).
81 For the detailed references, see above footnote 15.
82 Decision of the IOC Executive Board concerning the participation
of Russian Athletes in the Olympic Games Rio 2016, IOC Decision of
24 July 2016, para. 3: ‘‘The ROC is not allowed to enter any athlete
for the Olympic Games Rio 2016 who has ever been sanctioned for
doping, even if he or she has served the sanction.’’
83 CAS 2011/O/2422, USOC v. IOC, Award of 4 October 2011 and
CAS 2011/A/2658, British Olympic Association (BOA) v. World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA), Award of 30 April 2012.
84 CAS 2011/O/2422, USOC v. IOC, Award of 4 October 2011.
85 CAS OG 16/13, Anastasia Karabelshikova & Ivan Podshivalov v.
FISA & IOC, Award of 4 August 2016, para. 7.5 and CAS OG 16/04,
Yulia Efimova v. ROC, IOC & FINA, Award of 4 August 2016, para.
7.10.
86 CAS OG 16/13, para. 7.11 and CAS OG 16/04, para. 7.12.
87 CAS OG 16/13, para. 7.16 and CAS OG 16/04, para. 7.18.
88 CAS OG 16/13, para. 7.17.
89 Ibid.
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reconcile this paragraph [3] with the stated aim to provide
the athletes with an opportunity to rebut the presumption of
guilt and to recognise the right to natural justice.’’90 Con-
sequently, ‘‘this denial of the rules of natural justice ren-
ders paragraph 3 as unenforceable.’’91 Another related
question was whether paragraph 3 should be treated as an
eligibility rule or an additional sanction on athletes that had
already been sanctioned for positive doping test. Though
they deemed it a moot point, both Panels referred to the
well-known case law of the CAS on the ‘Osaka rule’ to find
that paragraph 3 constituted an additional sanction.92
While Efimova went on to win two medals, both
Karabelshikova and Podshivalov were barred from partic-
ipating to the Rio Games on other grounds.93 The fact that
paragraph 3 of the IOC Decision is deemed unenforceable
should come as no surprise to anybody involved in inter-
national sports law. The CAS jurisprudence on this matter
is very much a principle stand, meaning that under the
current WADC there is simply no room for an Olympic ban
in addition to a doping ban. This is a lesson often lost on
the media and general public during Olympic days, but non
bis in idem is a cornerstone principle of our legal systems
and cannot be discarded lightly. Why the IOC decided to
ignore this jurisprudence is open to interrogation.
3.2 On being implicated under the IOC Decision
The second, and by far largest, wave of complaints
involved Russian athletes barred from the game under
paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision.94 As will be explained in
this section, the CAS sided with the Ifs’ tough stance on the
Russian state-doping system. The first set of cases focussed
on the definition of the word ‘‘implicated’’ in paragraph 2
of the IOC Decision. In this regard, on 2 August, the IOC
sent a communication to the IFs aiming at providing some
general guidelines. It reads as follows:
‘‘In view of the recent appeals filed by Russian Ath-
letes with GAS, the IOC considers it necessary to
clarify the meaning of the notion ‘‘implicated’’ in the
EB Decision.
The IOC does not consider that each athlete referred
to in the McLaren Lists shall be considered per se
‘‘implicated’’. It is for each International federation
to assess, on the basis of the information provided in
the McLaren lists and the Independent Person
Report, whether it is satisfied that the Athlete in
question was implicated in the Russian State-con-
trolled doping scheme.
To assist the International Federations in assessing
each individual case, the IOC wishes to provide some
information. In the IOC’s opinion, an athlete should
not be considered as ‘‘implicated’’ where:
• The order was a ‘‘quarantine.’’
• The McLaren List does not refer to a prohibited
substance which would have given rise to an anti-
doping rule violation or;
• The McLaren List does not refer to any prohibited
substance with respect to a given sample.’’
The CAS went on to address this question in three cases
analysed below.95
3.2.1 CAS OG 16/19 Natalia Podolskaya & Alexander
Dyachenko v. ICF
Podolskaya and Dyachenko are two canoeists from Russia
who were suspended by the International Canoe Federation
(ICF) and removed from the Rio Games, because they were
deemed implicated in the IP Report. In an affidavit to the
CAS, referred to in the award, Richard McLaren disclosed
the facts that led to both athletes being considered
implicated.
Regarding Podolskaya, McLaren indicated that he has
retrieved electronic evidence that ‘‘reveals that on 31 July
2013 at 00:50 h, in contravention of the International
Standard for Laboratories, the Moscow Laboratory repor-
ted to email address av@sochi2014.com that sample
number 2780289, belonging to a female canoe athlete
taken at the Russian Championships in Moscow, was sus-
pected for EPO and further inquired what should be
done.’’96 In his quick response of 1 August 2013, Alexey
Velikodniy, then vice-minister for sports, ‘‘communicated
back to Laboratory that the sample number 2780289
90 Ibid., para. 7.18.
91 CAS OG 16/13, para. 7.18 and CAS OG 16/04, para. 7.25.
92 CAS OG 16/13, paras. 7.19–7.22 and CAS OG 16/04, para. 7–17.
93 Reuters, Two Russians Rowers to Miss Rio despite Winning
Doping Appeal, 5 August 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
olympics-rio-rowing-cas-idUSKCN10G1WV. Accessed 25 January
2017.
94 Decision of the IOC Executive Board concerning the participation
of Russian Athletes in the Olympic Games Rio 2016, IOC Decision of
24 July 2016, para. 2: ‘‘The IFs to examine the information contained
in the IP Report, and for such purpose seek from WADA the names of
athletes and National Federations (NFs) implicated. Nobody impli-
cated, be it an athlete, an official, or an NF, may be accepted for entry
or accreditation for the Olympic Games.’’
95 CAS OG 16/19, Natalia Podolskaya & Alexander Dyachenko v.
ICF, Award of 7 August 2016; CAS OG 16/21, Elena Anyushina &
Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF, Award of 7 August 2016; CAS
OG 16/12, Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC, Award of 4 August 2016. A
fourth case, CAS OG 16/18, Kiril Sveshnikov et al. v. UCI & IOC,
was declared inadmissible.
96 CAS OG 16/19, Natalia Podolskaya & Alexander Dyachenko v.
ICF, Award of 7 August 2016, para. 2.11.
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belonged to Ms. Natalia Podolskaya and instructed the
Laboratory to ‘‘SAVE’’.’’97 Similarly, as far as Dyachenko
is concerned, the ‘‘electronic evidence reveals that on 5
August 2014 at 12:09 h, in contravention of the Interna-
tional Standard Laboratories, the Moscow Laboratory
reported to Alexey Velikodniy that pre-departure sample
number 2917734, collected at a Training Camp on 3
August 2014, contained a lot of trenbolone and a little
methenolone. Alexey Velikodniy’s response to the labo-
ratory on 6 August 2014 at 1%:26 [sic] was that sample
number 2917734 from 3 August 2014 pre-departure test
belonging to Mr Alexander Dyachenko, and on instruction
from ‘‘llR’’, should be a ‘‘SAVE’’.’’98 McLaren concluded
that for both ‘‘Ms. Natalia Podolskaya and Alexander
Dyachenko, the ‘‘SAVE’’ instruction signalled to the
Laboratory that no further analytical bench work was to be
done on the samples and the Laboratory filed a negative
ADAMS report for each athlete.’’99
In its assessment of the application of paragraph 2 of the
IOC Decision by the ICF, the CAS Panel found that the
‘‘Applicants were among five athletes so [as implicated in
the IP Report] named’’ and that the ‘‘ICF was entitled to
conclude that the Applicants failed to meet the criteria in
paragraph 2.’’100 Moreover, this ‘‘conclusion has been
reinforced by the evidence made available to the Panel by
Professor McLaren’’ and ‘‘is justified on the standard of
comfortable satisfaction.’’101 The applicants, unsuccess-
fully, argued that they were never sanctioned for an anti-
doping rule violation, and that the samples referred to in
the IP Report cannot be tested anymore to prove their
innocence. They also claimed that other contemporary
samples returned negative and ‘‘that if they had used pro-
hibited substances, all the tests would have returned posi-
tive.’’102 Nonetheless, WADA pointed out that ‘‘due to the
nature of the substances concerned and the timing of the
provision of the samples, this cannot be concluded.’’103
The Panel accepted ‘‘WADA’s submission, not contra-
dicted by the Applicants, that there are explanations con-
sistent with the Applicant’s assertion but also consistent
with the taking of the prohibited substances at the relevant
time.’’104
Finally, the Russian applicants tried to fight their ineli-
gibility under the implication criteria laid down in para-
graph 2 of the IOC Decision by arguing that it was not
compatible with natural justice.105 Nevertheless, the CAS
refused to follow this line of reasoning. Instead, the Panel
found that the ‘‘Applicants have challenged that decision in
the CAS and have been given the opportunity to rebut that
evidence’’, thus they ‘‘have not been denied natural justice
or procedural fairness.’’106
3.2.2 CAS OG 16/21 Elena Anyushina & Alexey
Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF
Anyushina and Korovashkov are also two canoeists from
Russia. Similar to Podolskaya and Dyachenko, they were
suspended on 26 July 2016 by the ICF and removed from
the Rio Games as they were deemed implicated in the IP
report. However, Anyushina was quickly reinstated and
declared eligible to compete at the Games by the IOC.107
The procedure was, consequently, limited to Korovashkov.
He was deemed implicated because, as outlined by Richard
McLaren in his affidavit:
On 15 August 2014 at 09:22 h, in contravention of the
International Standard for Laboratories, the Moscow
Laboratory reported to Alexey Velikodniy that sample
number 2916461, collected 10 August 2014 in connection
with an International Competition being held in Moscow,
contained a lot of marijuana that was certainly above the
threshold. (The/CF website reflects that the/CF Canoe
Sprint World Championships took place in Moscow from
the 8–10 August 2014) Alexey Velikodniy’s response to the
Laboratory on 18 August 2014 at 08:59 identified that
sample number 2916461 belonged to Mr. Alexey Kor-
ovashkov and instructed that it should be a ‘SAVE.’’ Alexey
Velikodniy also notes that Mr. Alexey sample is under
investigation. Mr. Korovashkov’s sample number 2916461
was reported negative in ADAMS.108
The Russian canoeist argued that the ‘‘evidence con-
cerning the relevant sample on which the ICF relies to
support its decision is unreliable’’, because ‘‘there is no
‘‘threshold’’ provided for marijuana in WADA Technical
Document TD 2013DL of 11 May 2013 concerning
Decision Limits for the Confirmatory Quantification of
Threshold Substances.’’109 In his view, ‘‘[i]f there is no
threshold, it is unlikely that the laboratory would have
provided such odd information to Alexey Velikodniy rather
than reporting the threshold itself; the evidence does not
resemble a laboratory report Correspondence could not
have been authored by the laboratory’s employees, who are97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., para. 7.13.
101 Ibid., para. 7.14.
102 Ibid., para. 7.24.
103 Ibid., para. 7.24.
104 Ibid., para. 7.26.
105 Ibid., paras 7.15–7.26.
106 Ibid., para. 7.18.
107 CAS OG 16/21, Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF
& RCF, Award of 7 August 2016, para. 3.13.
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fully aware that they would be required to calculate and
then state the actual result.’’110 The Panel rebutted this
argument by pointing out that the relevant WADA docu-
ment included a threshold for Cannabinoids.111 The Panel
concluded that ‘‘the evidence is that the state sponsored
doping system was applied to the Second Applicant so as to
prevent a positive report of marijuana over the threshold
for that substance.’’112 Consequently, Korovashkov was
deemed implicated in the IP Report. The Panel did display
its sympathy with the Russian athlete, as it pointed out that
‘‘[t]he ICF indicated that marijuana is not, in its view, a
performance enhancing drug and the Panel notes that there
is no suggestion of any other substance involved.’’113
The Panel further rejected Korovashkov’s argument that
the ICF’s decision to declare him ineligible for the Rio
Olympics amounted to a wrongful anti-doping sanction.114
The applicant argued that the use of theword ‘‘suspended’’ in
the original letter to the ICF was the terminology used under
the WADC. The Panel found that even though ‘‘suspended’’
‘‘is a word used, and a sanction provided for, in the WADA
Code, this does not mean that its inclusion means that the
decision is made under that Code.’’115 Moreover, the CAS
arbitrators considered it ‘‘clear that the letter was in direct
response to the IOC Executive Board’s decision and con-
cerned the eligibility of Russian athletes to compete in the
Games of the XXXI Olympiad in Rio de Janeiro Games and
to be accredited to those Games.’’116 Thus, it ‘‘was not a
decision under the WADA Code and was not bound by the
provisions of that Code.’’117 In other words, the Decision
should not and could not be misconstrued as a doping ban
based on the WADC, but found its legal basis in the IOC
Decision and in Article 12.3 of the ICF Anti-doping Rules.
This case demonstrates the willingness of CAS arbitra-
tors to adopt a wide reading of the scope of the notion of
implication under the IOC Decision. If an athlete benefitted
from the Russian doping scheme, even in case of a rela-
tively harmless substance like cannabis, it was considered
legitimate for an IF to remove him or her from Russia’s
Olympic team.
3.2.3 CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC
Ivan Balandin is a rower from Russia who was declared
ineligible to compete at the Rio Olympics by the World
Rowing Federation (FISA) on 27 July 2016, due to his
implication in the IP Report. More precisely, he appears in
the Report as having been ‘‘saved’’ by the Russian Deputy
Minister of Sport and his test was later reported as negative
in the ADAMS system.118
The athlete first argued, as did Korovashkov, that this
was an anti-doping sanction, which did not follow the
appropriate procedure. WADA clarified ‘‘that the Athlete
may yet face proceedings relating to an ADRV, however,
the nature of these could yet to be determined [sic]’’119 and
added that the ‘‘matter at hand concerns eligibility for the
Rio Games.’’120 The Panel concurred and concluded that
the ‘‘dispute at hand concerns the Athlete’s eligibility for
the Rio Games alone.’’121
The next question was whether Balandin was implicated
in the IP Report. The Panel noted, as pointed out in the IOC
letter from 2 August 2016, that a simple implication in the
Report does not necessarily indicate that an athlete bene-
fited from the state-doping scheme. In his defence, the
athlete singled out that a date of collection was missing for
the sample, in order to attack the validity of the information
provided by McLaren. FISA responded that it had taken
‘‘the necessary steps to establish this date by calling
UKAD.’’122 Moreover, Richard McLaren revealed in his
amicus curiae that ‘‘the exact date and times of the message
from the Moscow Laboratory that the screen of the Ath-
lete’s A sample revealed positive for the prohibited sub-
stance GW 1516 and the response from the Deputy
Minister to change the positive into a negative, following
the DPM.’’123 In any event, the Panel was ‘‘satisfied that
the information provided to FISA and the additional checks
it took with UKAD, were sufficient to show the Athlete
was ‘‘implicated’’ in this scheme.’’124 The athlete was
deemed implicated, but the question remained whether he
actually benefit from the scheme. The Panel noted ‘‘that the
substance GW 1516 is a metabolic modulator and a non-
specified substance and is prohibited at all times (without a
threshold).’’125 Additionally, ‘‘the instruction from the
Deputy Minister was ‘‘save’’.’’126 Thus, the CAS arbitra-
tors were ‘‘comfortably satisfied’’ that Balandin had ben-
efitted from the scheme.
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In all three cases, the athletes mentioned in the Report as
‘saved’were recognized as implicated by theCAS. The court
clearly distinguished the notion of implication from the fact
that the athletes committed an anti-doping violation as
defined under theWADC.However, it is unclear whether the
arbitrators would have deemed an athlete implicated, if he or
she was not named in the evidence provided byMcLaren. As
the disappearing positive methodology implemented by the
Moscow laboratory was an ultima ratio, this still entails that
many Russian athletes competing in Rio might have profited
from Russia’s state-doping scheme by escaping a positive
test altogether. Hence, the IOC’s choice to narrow down on
implicated athletes seems rather inadequate to tackle the
generalized doping system unveiled by the IC and IP reports.
3.3 On being sufficiently tested under the IOC
Decision
Paragraph 2 of the IOCDecision also directed the IFs to verify
the athletes’ individual anti-doping record.127 This part of the
IOC Decision was central to a case involving Daniil
Andrienko and 16 othermembers of the Russian rowing team,
who challenged a decision of the World Rowing Federation
(FISA) to declare them ineligible for the Rio Olympics. The
FISAExecutiveCommittee took the decision on24 July 2016,
because they had not ‘‘undergone a minimum of three anti-
doping tests analysed by aWADAaccredited laboratory other
than theMoscow laboratory and registered inADAMS from1
January 2015 for an 18 month period.’’128 In their submis-
sions, the Russian applicants did not challenge the IOC
Decision, and thus the criteria enshrined in paragraph 2, but
only its application by FISA.129 The Russian athletes argued
that FISA’s decision deviated from the IOCDecision in that it
was imposing as an additional requirement that rowers must
‘‘have undergone a minimum of three anti-doping tests anal-
ysed by a WADA accredited laboratory other than the Mos-
cow laboratory and registered in ADAMS from 1 January
2015 for an 18-month period.’’130 The Panel acknowledged
‘‘the IOCExecutiveBoard decision does not refer explicitly to
the requirement of three tests or to a period of 18 months.’’131
Nonetheless, it found ‘‘that the Challenged Decision is in line
with the criteria established by the IOC Executive Board
decision.’’132 Indeed, the IOC’s Decision provided ‘‘that in
order to examine whether the level playing field is affected or
not (when admitting a Russian athlete to the Rio Olympic
Games), the federation must look at the athlete’s respective
anti-doping record, i.e. examine the athlete’s anti-doping
tests’’ and that ‘‘[i]n doing so, the IOC Executive Board
decision specifies that only ‘‘reliable adequate international
tests’’ may be taken into account.’’133 In this regard, the Panel,
and FISA, shared the view that ‘‘a reliable adequate interna-
tional test can only be assumed if the sample has been ana-
lyzed in a WADA-accredited laboratory outside Russia.’’134
Finally, with regard to the need of having three tests, the
‘‘relevant paragraph in the IOC Executive Board decision
further refers to ‘‘adequate international tests’’ and, con-
sequently, makes it clear that - in principle - a single test is
not sufficient to rebut the presumption of ‘‘collective
responsibility’’.’’135 This follows ‘‘from the word ‘‘tests’’
being used in the plural form, but also from the word
‘‘adequate’’, since a single negative anti-doping test can
hardly be adequate to rebut the presumption of ‘‘collective
responsibility’’.’’136 The CAS also points out a number of
other reasons why three tests are a rational benchmark:
• ‘‘[…]rowing is at the same time a sport requiring
strength and endurance and, thus, is exposed to a
significant doping threat’’;
• There is ‘‘a history of doping cases in the Russian
Rowing Federation’’;
• FISA ‘‘took also into consideration WADA’s ‘‘Guide-
lines Implementing an Effective Testing Programme’’,
which refers to a minimum of three tests per year for
Registered Testing Pool athletes’’;
• ‘‘FISA also bore in mind that it only provides for a
relatively small number of events where tests can be
carried out compared to other sports.’’137
Hence, ‘‘FISA’s implementation and application of the
criteria listed in the IOC Executive Board decision is
consistent and fully compliant with the wording and the
spirit of the IOC’s decision.’’138 The CAS Panel rejected
the pleas brought forward by the athletes on the basis of
natural justice and fundamental procedural principles, as
they did not challenge the IOC Decision directly but only
its implementation.
Surprisingly, FISAwas the only Federation (alongside the
IAAF), which systematically refused entry to Russian
127 Decision of the IOC Executive Board concerning the participation
of Russian Athletes in the Olympic Games Rio 2016, IOC Decision of
24 July 2016, para. 2: ‘‘The IFs should carry out an individual
analysis of each athlete’s anti-doping record, taking into account only
reliable adequate international tests, and the specificities of the
athlete’s sport and its rules, in order to ensure a level playing field.’’
128 CAS OG 16/11, Daniil Andrienko et al. v. FISA & IOC, Award of
2 August 2016, para. 2.6.
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athletes because they were not exposed to proper indepen-
dent anti-doping testing. If each IF had imposed similar
standards, it is unlikely that many Russian athletes would
have been able to participate in the Rio Games. Furthermore,
the case also highlights once again that the CASwas ready to
endorse strict conditions for the eligibility of Russian ath-
letes. Here again, the IOC could very well have decided to
impose a similar condition across the board instead of
leaving each federation decide for itself and, thus, promote
differentiated treatments depending on the sporting
discipline.
3.4 On bringing weightlifting into disrepute
In paragraph 2 of its Decision, the IOC mentioned the
possibility for IFs to ‘‘apply their respective rules in rela-
tion to the sanctioning of entire NF’s.’’ This is exactly what
the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) did when
it decided on 29 July 2016 to exclude the whole Russian
Weightlifting Federation (RWF) from the Rio Olympics
for having brought the sport into disrepute. Indeed, Article
12. 4 of the IWF Anti-doping Policy, foresees that:
‘‘If any Member federation or members or officials
thereof, by reason of conduct connected with or
associated with doping or anti-doping rule violations,
brings the sport of weightlifting into disrepute, the
IWF Executive Board may, in its discretion, take
such action as it deems fit to protect the reputation
and integrity of the sport.’’
The Russian Federation first disputed, to no avail, that
there was sufficient legal basis in the IWF regulations for
such a blanket ban. The Panel found that ‘‘Article 12.4 ADP
constitutes a sufficient legal basis.’’139 Moreover, it added
that the ‘‘power of the IWFExecutiveBoard, in its discretion,
to take such action as it deems fit to protect the reputation and
integrity of the sport, was not challenged by RWF.’’140
There were subsequently two main questions related to
application of Article 12.4 ADP to be discussed:
• Based on the information available, could the IWF
reasonably conclude that there was a ‘‘conduct con-
nected with or associated with doping’’?
• And, was it sufficient to ‘‘bring the sport of weightlift-
ing into disrepute’’?
First, the CAS Panel noted that in assessing whether there
was a ‘‘conduct connected with or associated with doping’’,
IWF ‘‘referred to various sources of information.’’141 It
relied on the IP Report that ‘‘submits that 117 Russian
weightlifters were included in this centrally dictated pro-
gram’’142 and ‘‘on the results from the retesting of the Lon-
don and Beijing Olympics’’,143 which ‘‘turned out nine
AAFs for Russian weightlifters.’’144 The Panel held that this
‘‘information constitutes ‘‘conduct connected with or asso-
ciated with doping’’’’ that ‘‘on its face is sufficiently reli-
able.’’145 Indeed, it reminds that the IP Report applied a
standard of proof of ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt.’’ Further-
more, the Panel adds that ‘‘the findings of the McLaren
Report were taken seriously by the IOC and lead to the IOC
Executive Board’s decision dated 24 July 2016 that enacted
eligibility criteria specifically for Russian athletes, which is
unique in the history of the Olympic Games’’146 and ‘‘were
endorsed by WADA, the supreme authority in the world of
sport to lead and coordinate the fight against doping and by
other international federations, such as the IAAF.’’147
Finally, ‘‘the information contained in theMcLarenReport is
also corroborated by the reanalysis of the athlete’s samples at
the London and Beijing Olympics.’’148 The fact that all nine
Russian athletes retested were positive for the same sub-
stance, Turinabol, is deemed ‘‘a strong indication that they
were part of a centrally dictated program.’’149
Are these findings enough to bring weightlifting into
disrepute? For the Panel, disrepute ‘‘refers to loss of rep-
utation or dishonour.’’150 Thus, ‘‘the IWF’s conclusion that
the above facts bring the sport of weightlifting in disrepute
is neither incompatible with the applicable provisions nor
arbitrary.’’151 The Russian doping scandal is ‘‘one of the
biggest doping scandals in sports history’’, and ‘‘paired
with the findings from the retesting of samples led the IWF
to consider that the actions of the RWF and the Russian
weightlifters brought the sport of weightlifting into disre-
pute, because it draws a picture of this sport as being
doping infested.’’152 Consequently, the CAS arbitrators
considered that ‘‘the Applicant has failed to demonstrate
that the IWF’s conclusion that, based on the evidence
before it, the conduct of the RWF brought the sport of
weightlifting in disrepute, was unreasonable.’’153
Lastly, the RWF brought forward the much-used ‘we were
not the only ones!’ argument. Indeed, it highlighted that the
139 CAS OG 16/09, RWF v. IWF, Award of 3 August 2016, para. 7.5.
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‘‘retesting of the London and Beijing samples has not only
resulted in AAFs [Adverse Analytical Findings or positive
doping test] for Russian athletes, but also revealed AAFs for
other member federations.’’154 Yet, the Panel rebuked this
argument by stating ‘‘that the situation in Russian weightlift-
ing is - apparently - of a different dimension’’, as it ‘‘has not
been reported nor submitted that othermember federations are
involved in a centrally dictated and managed doping pro-
gram.’’155 In this regard, it noted ‘‘the impressivenumber of61
Russian weightlifters benefitted from the Disappearing Posi-
tive Methodology’’ and the fact ‘‘that the whole Russian del-
egation for the London Olympics was - according to the
information provided - involved in doping.’’156
Once again, an IF taking a strong stance and barring the
whole Russian team to participate in the Rio Olympics is
vindicated by the CAS.
3.5 Saving the last Russian woman standing:
the Klishina miracle
Darya Klishina is now an Olympic celebrity. She will not
enter the history books for winning a gold medal or setting a
world record, however. Instead, her idiosyncrasy lies in her
nationality: she was the sole Russian athlete authorized to
stand in the athletics competitions at the Rio Olympics. And
yet, a few days before the start of the long jump contest in
which she was due to take part, the IAAF surprisingly
decided to revoke her eligibility.157 Klishina successfully
appealed the decision to the CAS ad hoc Division and, as a
result, was allowed to compete at the Olympics.
Two important questions are raised by this case:
• Why did the IAAF changed its mind and decide to
retract Klishina’s authorization to participate?
• Why did the CAS overturn this decision?
3.5.1 The IAAF’s second thoughts over the implication
of Klishina
So, what happened between 9 July, when Klishina was first
green lighted by the IAAF Doping Review Board (IAAF
DRB) and 10 August when the IAAF DRB revoked its pre-
vious decision to let her compete?Basically, the publicationof
the McLaren Report, and the communication of evidence
showing ‘‘that the Applicant had been directly affected and
tainted by the state-organised doping scheme described in the
IP Report.’’158 More concretely, according to the Report,
Klishina was affected in the following three ways:
(i) ‘‘a sample collected on 26 February 2014, yielding
a T/E ratio of 8.5, had been subject to a ‘‘SAVE’’
order by the Ministry of Sport on 3 March 2014;
(ii) a sample collected on 17 October 2014 and
subsequently seized by WADA on December
2014 was found to bear marks and scratches
consistent with the removal of the cap and
contained urine from the Applicant but also from
another female athlete; and
(iii) a sample collected on the occasion of the 2013
IAAF World Championships in Moscow was also
found to bear marks and scratches consistent with
the removal of the cap.’’159
In its original decision, the IAAF DRB had reserved its
right ‘‘to reconsider the Applicant’s case should informa-
tion ever be brought to its attention (including but not
limited to as a result of the current investigation being
conducted by Professor McLaren on behalf of WADA) that
the Doping Review Board considers is such as to under-
mine the basis upon which the application was accep-
ted.’’160 Thus, unsurprisingly, the CAS acknowledged that
the IAAF DRB had the competence to reconsider the eli-
gibility granted to the athlete. Nonetheless, unexpectedly, it
found that such reconsideration was not legitimate.
3.5.2 The surprising decision of the CAS to let Klishina
jump
Klishina won in front of the CAS. From an outsider’s per-
spective this must be a surprising decision, since she was at
least as implicated in the IPReport as numerous other Russian
athletes who were barred from entering the Games. Indeed,
she had clearly profited from being ‘‘saved’’ by the Russian
Ministry of Sport. Sowhy did the CAS decide to let her jump?
This decision is intimately linked with the legal basis of
the original decision of the IAAF DRB. Despite the repe-
ated view of the IOC that the IAAF policy was stricter than
its own,161 the Klishina case demonstrates that this is not
universally true in practice. The main point was that in its
previous decision the IAAF DRB had recognized that since
1 January 2014, Klishina ‘‘had been subject to fully
154 Ibid., para. 7.14.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 BBC, Rio Olympics 2016: Russia’s Darya Klishina Banned by
IAAF, 13 August 2016. http://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/
37073758. Accessed 25 January 2017.
158 CAS OG 16/24, Darya Klishina v. IAAF, Award of 15 August
2016, para. 2.12.
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160 Ibid., para. 2.8.
161 CAS OG 16/13, Anastasia Karabelshikova and Ivan Podshivalov
v. World Rowing Federation (FISA) and International Olympic
Committee (IOC), Award of 4 August 2016, para. 7.14 and CAS OG
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compliant drug testing in- and out-of-competition’’162 and
therefore fulfilled the criteria enshrined in the IAAF
Competition rule 22.1A(b). This was based on the fol-
lowing factual findings:
• ‘‘The fact that she had spent 632 days out of Russia,
being 86.6% of her time, in the Relevant Period;
• She had relocated permanently to the United States in
March 2014 and had been trained under a US coach
since October 2013;
• She regularly competes in competitions on the interna-
tional circuit;
• A total of 11 samples had been collected from the
Applicant outside of Russia in the Relevant Period;
• 1 sample had been collected by the IAAF since June
2016 and sent for analysis by a laboratory outside of
Russia.’’163
The question is then whether the new information,
indicating that Klishina was implicated and benefitted from
the Russian doping scheme, recognized as valid by the
Panel,164 could justify revisiting the first decision. In other
words, could this new information lead to reconsidering the
eligibility of Klishina under the regime of IAAF Compe-
tition rule 22.1A(b) on which the original decision was
based? To assess this, the Panel started by pointing out that
the rule ‘‘is not the same as the decision of the IOC
Executive Board made after the publication of the IP
Report. (…) As the parties agreed, the IOC Executive
Board decision is not in evidence in this case and decisions
of the Ad hoc Panel of the CAS for the Games of the XXXI
Olympiad in Rio de Janeiro as to the application of, or the
terms of, the IOC Executive Board decision are not
applicable.’’165
The CAS Panel insisted that the IAAF’s DRB ‘‘was
comfortably satisfied that during the Relevant Period the
Applicant satisfied each of the criteria set out in the Rule
for exceptional eligibility, notwithstanding the suspension
of the National Federation.’’166 Furthermore, ‘‘in making
its findings, the DRB was aware of, and took no account of,
tests conducted in Russia and that it was cognisant of
inadequacies in the system of testing in Russia, for which
RusAF had been suspended.’’167 Those are decisive con-
clusions that will lead to the second decision being set
aside. The CAS Panel was of the view ‘‘that the conclusion
reached in the Second Decision, and the basis for that
decision, are not in accordance with the Rule which was
purportedly invoked.’’168 It is so, because ‘‘the further
evidence considered by the DRB for the purposes of the
Second Decision did not undermine its finding in the First
Decision that the Applicant was eligible to compete by
reason of her compliance with the Rule.’’169 This analysis
led to a seemingly unfair solution as the undisputed evi-
dence pointed at Klishina profiting not once but on three
occasions from the Russian doping scheme.
This decision is grounded on the following legal rea-
soning: the Panel considered that the ‘‘implication [of
Klishina in the State-doping system] is not relevant to the
application of criteria which, if fulfilled, mean that for the
purposes of the Rule [22 IAAF], the Applicant is not
affected or tainted by the failures of the National Feder-
ation.’’170 Indeed, the IAAF Rule ‘‘provides for a mech-
anism or a basis by which an athlete is granted
exceptional eligibility.’’171 And this ‘‘mechanism is ful-
filment of the two criteria which, for this athlete, was
established by the DRB in the First Decision.’’172 Thus,
the ‘‘fact that the athlete was subjected to or the subject of
drug testing that was not fully compliant during the Rel-
evant Period does not derogate from the fact that she was,
during the Relevant Period (that is, ‘a sufficiently long
period’), subject to fully compliant drug testing in- and
out-of- competition by reason of the fact that she was
during that time training in and resident in the United
States and not in Russia.’’173 Additionally, ‘‘there is no
evidence to suggest that the testing that she was subject to
was other than equivalent in quality to the testing to which
her competitors were subject.’’174 In other words, ‘‘an
athlete may have undergone non-compliant testing while
concurrently being subject to fully compliant testing and
still fulfil the second criterion.’’175 This is comforted by
the fact ‘‘that the Rule is addressed to the suspension of
any International Federation for failure to put in place an
adequate system and the impact on the eligibility of the
athlete’’ and the ‘‘criteria are directed to the establishment
by an athlete that he or she is outside the country of his or
her National Federation during the Relevant Period.’’176
Hence, it ‘‘is not addressed to the implication of an athlete
in a defective system.’’177 Instead, ‘‘it states that an
162 CAS OG 16/24, Darya Klishina v. IAAF, Award of 15 August
2016, para. 7.3.
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athlete is taken not to be affected or tainted by the action
of the National Federation if he or she was subject to
other, compliant systems outside of the country.’’178 In a
nutshell, for the CAS Panel, the ‘‘relevant question is not
whether the athlete was affected by the Russian System,
or how, or whether she had knowledge of the way in
which the system worked.’’179 No, the only question is
‘‘whether she fulfilled the criteria of the Rule.’’180 And the
direct answer to that question is: she did early July; and
she still does in August!
This case is disconcerting as it contradicts the line of
cases regarding the implication of athletes in the IP Report
discussed above. The CAS relied on the ambiguous
wording of the IAAF provision to offer an escape route to
Klishina. In doing so, it disregarded the spirit and objective
of the provision, which was to provide a mechanism for
athletes who were not personally tainted by the Russian
doping scandal to participate in IAAF competitions. Yet,
another aspect of the case is even more bizarre. Why did
the IOC not block the eligibility of Klishina on the basis of
paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision? She was undoubtedly
implicated and benefited from the scheme. In fact, only one
of the three sources of implication provided by McLaren
should (and would) have been enough for the IOC Review
Panel and the CAS arbitrator reviewing her eligibility to
discard her from the Olympics.181 It did not happen, Zeus
only knows…
3.6 Conclusion
In general, the CAS has been willing, with the exceptions
of Efimova and Klishina, to approve the ineligibility of
Russian athletes. Rightfully, in my view, the CAS has
supported the IFs that have opted for a strict approach in
dealing with the eligibility of Russian athletes for the Rio
Olympics. The CAS has also unsurprisingly rebutted the
blunt rule of the IOC excluding Russian athletes who were
previously sanctioned for doping. Nevertheless, it has
surprisingly let Klishina participate, in spite of all the
factual elements pointing at her being implicated in, and
having profited from, the Russian state-doping scheme.
Overall, the CAS ad hoc Division has served its purpose as
a review instance well, forcing the IFs and the IOC to
properly justify their decisions and providing an avenue for
the Russian athletes to be heard.
These cases also highlight the variety/plurality of
responses to the Russian doping scandal and its impact on
the eligibility of Russian athletes for the Rio Olympics. It
seems that some IFs have taken WADA’s call for a strong
response seriously.182 Unfortunately, and this is one of the
negative consequences of the IOC’s decision to delegate
the final decision to the IFs, due to a lack of information, it
is impossible to assess the different policies of the IFs
which have not faced (due to their reluctance to act or else)
a challenge of their eligibility decisions in front of the CAS
ad hoc Division. In light of recent revelations concerning
the International Swimming Federation (FINA), it is likely
that a number of IFs decided to interpret narrowly the IOC
criteria and waved through the overwhelming majority of
Russian athletes without a proper check.183
Finally, the awards show that CAS arbitrators would
have been ready to condone a general ineligibility of
Russian athletes, with a narrow exception for those capable
of proving that they were not affected by the scandal or
who could not benefit from the scheme because they were
residing outside of the Russian Federation. The CAS rec-
ognized the seriousness of the situation and the collective
responsibility of Russia’s SGBs. It seemed also ready to
follow-up on this collective responsibility by endorsing
collective ineligibilities that would most likely have been
found compatible with the Russian athletes ‘natural rights’.
The CAS emphasized also its judicial restraint and respect
for the autonomy of the SGBs and their decisions with
regard to the Russian athletes. Hence, ultimately, the IOC’s
decision to let the Russian athletes compete at the Rio
Olympics may have been politically unavoidable, but was
certainly not legally mandated. I leave to the reader to
appreciate whether this decision is compatible with the
IOC’s proclaimed fundamental values and its commitment
to enforcing the WADC.
4 The ‘IPC Award’
Finally, the last award of the CAS related to the Russian
doping scandal concerned the use of clauses 9.2.2 and 9.3
of the IPC Constitution to suspend the Russian Paralympic
Committee (RPC) for failing to fulfil its obligations as a
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the IPC Constitution includes the obligation ‘‘to comply
with the World Anti-Doping Code’’184 and to ‘‘contribute
to the creation of a drug-free sport environment for all
Paralympic athletes in conjunction with the World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA).’’185 The RPC challenged the
claim that it had failed to comply with these obligations.
Furthermore, it considered that in any event the sanction
applied was disproportionate.
4.1 Did the RPC fail to comply with its membership
obligations?
TheRPCcontested in full the factual findings of theMcLaren
Report. Yet, the Panel held that the RPC failed to provide the
necessary evidence to rebut McLaren’s factual claims. In
particular, the RPC ‘‘decided not to cross-examine him
although given the opportunity to do so’’186 and ‘‘did not call
any athlete named by Professor McLaren as having been
subject to the system he described.’’187 In other words,
‘‘McLaren’s evidence stands uncontradicted.’’188 However,
in light of the lack of precise information, the Panel refused
to conclude at the IPC’s request that ‘‘the RPC and its Board
Members were involved in, or complicit in, or knew of the
existence of State sponsored doping of athletes and the
methodologies as set out in the IP Report.’’189
Nonetheless, the arbitrators also asserted that it is
‘‘undisputed that the RPC accepted the obligations imposed
on it as a member of the IPC’’, and amongst those obli-
gations there is ‘‘the specific obligation under Article 20.1
of the WADA Code to adopt and implement anti-doping
policies and rules for the Paralympic Games which con-
form with the WADA Code.’’190 Moreover, ‘‘the obligation
vigorously to pursue all potential anti-doping rule viola-
tions within its jurisdiction and to investigate cases of
doping (Article 20.4.10), are not passive.’’191 Thus, at a
national level ‘‘the RPC is the responsible entity having the
obligation to the IPC as well as to the IPCs’ members to
ensure that no violations of the anti-doping system occur
within Russia.’’192 However, the mere ‘‘existence of the
system as described in the IP Report and in the McLaren
affidavit means that the RPC breached its obligations and
conditions of membership of the IPC.’’193
Those are extremely important considerations to sup-
port the effectiveness of the world anti-doping system. In
practice, the CAS is closing the door on national feder-
ations hiding behind the failure of other anti-doping
bodies to deny their responsibility. If decided inversely,
this would have led to a situation of organized irrespon-
sibility, in which the bucket is simply passed over to a
public institution (in Russia’s case RUSADA) that cannot
be effectively sanctioned under current anti-doping rules.
Indeed, WADA declared RUSADA noncompliant, but
RUSADA is not a member of sporting associations and it
does not enter athletes in international sporting competi-
tions. Consequently, SGBs would be hard pressed to find
a way to impose any deterrent sanctions against it. If
noncompliance is to be met with adequate sanctions,
national SGBs, which are tasked to supervise specific
sports at national level, must bear the indirect responsi-
bility for the systemic failure of the anti-doping system
operating in their home country.
4.2 Is the sanction imposed by the IPC
proportionate?
As the Panel recognized from the outlet: ‘‘the more difficult
question for consideration is whether the decision to suspend
the RPC without reservation, or alleviation of the conse-
quences to Russian Paralympic athletes, was proportion-
ate.’’194 The RPC submitted ‘‘that the IPC could have adopted
a ‘‘softer measure’’ that still permitted clean Russian athletes
to compete in the ParalympicGames inRio.’’195 Furthermore,
it argued, ‘‘that a blanket prohibition is not justified, as it has
not been established that all para-athletes nominated by the
RPC have ever been implicated in doping.’’196
4.2.1 Whose rights are disproportionately affected?
The Panel considered first that as para-athletes are not
parties to this appeal, ‘‘[q]uestions of athletes’ rights that
may not derive from the RPC, but of which they them-
selves are the original holder, such as rights of natural
justice, or personality rights, or the right to have the same
opportunities to compete as those afforded to Russian
Olympic athletes by the IOC in its decision of 24 July 2016
regarding the Olympic Games Rio 2016, are not for this
Panel to consider.’’197 Instead, the ‘‘matter for review by
this Panel is thus not the legitimacy of a ‘‘collective
sanction’’ of athletes, but whether or not the IPC was
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entitled to suspend one of its (direct) members.’’198 Fur-
thermore, ‘‘the collective member cannot hide behind those
individuals that it represents.’’199
Here the Panel adopted a relatively formalistic reasoning
by denying the RPC the competence to invoke the rights of
its members (the athletes). This might be in contradiction
with the idea that athletes bear a responsibility for the
noncompliance of their national SGBs. The RPC does, at
least partly, represent the athletes, and there is a good case
that can be made for it to be allowed to raise the potential
infringements of the personality rights of its members in
this procedure. It does not mean that the rights of the
athletes were disproportionately affected, only that they
should have been considered and not brushed aside at this
preliminary stage as the Panel did in the present instance.
4.2.2 The extraordinary nature of the RPC’s regulatory
failure
Unfortunately, the award’s analytical structure can lead to
some confusion when dealing with the proportionality
analysis of the IPC’s decision. There are two (implicit)
steps that are key in the decision. First, an analysis of the
depth (and consequences) of the RPC’s regulatory failure,
and second an analysis of the proportionality of the sanc-
tion responding to this failure. The former will be dealt
with in this section.
The Panel pointed out that the IPC ‘‘was faced with
probative evidence of widespread systemic doping under
the RPCs ‘‘watch’’.’’200 Moreover, as argued by the IPC,
the RPC’s failure to act is even more acute in light of the
IPC’s dependence on national members to implement its
policies at national level. Thus, in particular, ‘‘the IPC
relies on the RPC to ensure compliance in Russia with its
zero tolerance anti-doping policy.’’201 More generally,
‘‘this federal system with complementary international and
national obligations is the core back-bone of the fight
against doping.’’202 In this context, the fact that the RPC
claimed that ‘‘it did not know what was happening and that
it had no control over those involved in the system
described by Professor McLaren does not relieve the RPC
of its obligations but makes matters worse.’’203 Though it is
unclear from the formulation used in this section of the
award, the outcome of the case points undoubtedly to the
fact that the Panel endorsed the IPC’s understanding of the
scope of responsibility of the RPC. Furthermore, the
arbitrators insisted that the ‘‘damage caused by the sys-
temic, non-compliance is substantial.’’204 Concluding,
therefore, that the RPC ‘‘had a non-delegable responsibility
with respect to implementing an anti-doping policy in
conformity with the WADA Code in Russia.’’205 In other
words, the RPC could not simply ‘‘delegate the conse-
quences [of this responsibility] where other bodies within
Russia acting as its agent implement a systemic system of
doping and cover-up.’’206
4.2.3 The proportionality of the sanction
The key question in the proportionality analysis was
whether the sanction inflicted upon the RPC was adequate
and necessary to attain its aim. The reasoning of the Panel
is piecemeal and spread around a number of paragraphs of
the award, which are regrettably not well connected
together.
The first question is whether the IPC was pursuing a
legitimate objective when imposing a sanction on the RPC.
On the IPC’s own account, the sanction was considered
‘‘the only way to ensure that the system, and systematised
doping, in Russia no longer continued.’’207 It added ‘‘that it
was a legitimate aim to send a message that made clear the
lack of tolerance on the part of the IPC to such systemic
failure in a country.’’208 The Panel recognized that the
‘‘concern that clean athletes, inside and outside of Russia,
have confidence in the ability to compete on a level playing
field, and the integrity and credibility of the sporting con-
test, represent powerful countervailing factors to the col-
lateral or reflexive effect on Russian athletes as a result of
the suspension’’,209 and constituted ‘‘an overriding public
interest that the IPC was entitled to take into account in
coming to the Decision.’’210
The second question linked to the proportionality of the
sanction relates to its necessity. Was there a less restrictive
alternative sanction available to attain the aim pursued?
The IPC argued that the suspension of the RPC’s mem-
bership was necessary for three reasons:
• ‘‘to provoke behavioural change (for the future) within
the sphere of responsibility of the RPC’’;
• ‘‘the suspension took into account that the failures in
the past had resulted in a distorted playing field on an
international level, because the IPC anti-doping policy
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid., para. 81.
201 Ibid., para. 82.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid., para. 86.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid., para. 83.
208 Ibid., para. 84.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
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was not being adequately enacted and enforced vis-a`-
vis para-athletes affiliated to RPC’’;
• ‘‘a strong message had to be issued to restore public
confidence, since the Paralympic movement depends –
much more than other sports – on the identification with
moral values.’’211
The Panel held that the suspension was ‘‘a powerful
message to restore public confidence.’’ It insisted also that
there ‘‘was no submission to the Panel of an alternative
measure that would, comparably and effectively, restore a
level playing field for the present and the immediate
future, affect future behavioral change and restore public
trust.’’212
Finally, the Panel concluded that ‘‘in light of the extent
of the application of the system described by Professor
McLaren and his findings of the system that prevailed in
Russia, made beyond reasonable doubt, the Decision to
suspend the national federation was not disproportion-
ate.’’213 Moreover, it insisted that the consequences for the
athletes were following logically from the suspension of
the RPC and therefore proportionate, as it had decided in
the IAAF case. The Panel also brushed aside the RPC’s
attempt to portray the IPC’s decision as contrary to the IOC
Decision. On the one side, it found the IOC Decision to be
irrelevant for the IPC and, on the other, it considered the
IPC’s suspension to be in any event compatible with the
Decision.
The German courts (including the German Constitu-
tional Court), before which the Russian athletes tried to
challenge the IPC decision, later fully endorsed this
approach.214 They insisted that a balancing exercise
between the interests of the athletes to participate in the
Paralympic Games and the interests of the IPC to defend
clean and doping-free competitions, would be decided to
the benefit of the latter. Even though athletes might not be
directly responsible of the state-doping scheme, they share
the responsibility (as in the IAAF case) for the governance
failures of their governing bodies.
5 Conclusion
The CAS has played (and will play in upcoming disputes) a
key role in responding to the Russian doping scandal. This
is in line with its general function as a judicial check on the
autonomy of the SGBs, while also acknowledging their
legitimate authority in setting the rules of the game. In the
awards reviewed, it has clearly sided with the SGBs (e.g.
IAAF, IPC, FISA, IWF) which have adopted a tougher
stance vis-a`-vis their Russian members and Russian ath-
letes. Broadly speaking, there are three main takeaways
from these cases:
– First, an athlete’s eligibility to international sporting
competitions cannot be severed from the status of her
national SGBs. In other words, the athletes, as
members of a national SGB, bear part of the
responsibility for the SGB’s failure to comply with,
for example, its duties under the WADC. This does
not preclude the introduction of legal mechanisms
that, as the one introduced by the IAAF, would
enable athletes to discharge this responsibility in
specific circumstances.
– Second, IFs can impose painful sanctions upon their
affiliates in case of noncompliance with their duties
under the WADC. The CAS recognized that in order
to function properly, the WADC needs to be
supported at the national level, and to be supported
at the national level noncompliance must be met with
deterrent sanctions that will necessarily extend to the
athletes affiliated with the noncompliant body.
Again, the athletes are not passive members of a
national SGB. They bear a share of the political (and
in the end legal) responsibility attached to its
governance.
– Third, the CAS has demonstrated that there was no
fatality in taking a lenient road to deal with the Russian
state-doping scandal. In the IAAF award, the Panel
even left open the possibility for the IOC to decide that
Russian athletes would have to compete under a neutral
flag. This is a good reminder that the IOC’s decisions to
let the Russian athletes compete at the Rio Olympics,
and thus dilute the negative effects of being caught
organizing a comprehensive state-doping system (as
was very recently evidenced by the second McLaren
Report), was not a legally mandated decision but a
political choice that deserves critical scrutiny.215 Thus,
the IPC’s decision to find all Russian athletes ineligible
for the Rio Paralympics was endorsed by both the CAS
211 Ibid., para. 88.
212 Ibid., para. 89.
213 Ibid., para. 91.
214 On the German rulings see A. Duval, The Russian Doping
Scandal at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The IPC’s Rio
Ineligibility of the Russian Paralympic Athletes, ASSER International
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and, remarkably, by the German Constitutional
Court.216
At the time of writing, it is unclear where the Russian
doping scandal will lead us next.217 The IOC is still in
the process of investigating the situation and determining
whether it will adopt sanctions against the ROC.218 The
IAAF and the IPC are now in a second phase, aimed at
monitoring with the help of WADA and independent
taskforces the evolution of Russia’s anti-doping poli-
cies.219 Once Russia’s policies will be deemed compliant
with the IAAF and IPC’s reinstatement criteria, the
Russian SGBs will recover their full membership rights
and Russian athletes their eligibility for international
competitions. Finally, WADA is still trying to re-orga-
nize its operation to strengthen its compliance
capabilities.220
The Russian doping scandal has highlighted many
unsuspected weaknesses of the world anti-doping system.
First, it has become clear that the WADC is not self-ap-
plicable. In fact, harmonizing the anti-doping rules was not
sufficient to have the levelling, or ‘‘defragmenting’’,221
effect hoped for.222 In other words, we are re-discovering
in the anti-doping context the well-known distinction
between law in the books and law in action.223 Second, and
logically following from this first lesson, the national (and
local) level matters very much for the concrete operation of
the WADC. The world anti-doping system does not con-
stitute a separate transnational legal order disconnected
from national laws. Nor did the entry into force of the
UNESCO Convention really put an end to the diversity of
approaches to anti-doping at the national level.224 Legal
pluralism and particularism characterize the enforcement
and implementation of the WADC in a world akin to a
mosaic of diverse regulatory realities.225 Instead of evi-
dencing the emergence of an overarching global adminis-
trative law, as envisaged for example by Lorenzo Casini,226
the WADC has been rather the embodiment of what one
could call ‘glocal administrative law’.227 Third, it is now
obvious that WADA is a weak institution as far as its
capacity to monitor and enforce the WADC is con-
cerned.228 In enforcing the Code, WADA must rely on the
goodwill of national authorities and their material capacity
to deploy efficient anti-doping policies. Moreover, the
enforcement of the WADC is also dependent on the will-
ingness of SGBs to sanction their members (and ultimately
the athletes) for their noncompliance with the Code.
WADA is constructed as a toothless tiger deprived of the
private or public power to enforce its claim to authority. At
best it can flag and publically shame noncompliant public
or private authorities, but if the SGBs do not follow
through on the information provided, its capacity to give
real bite to the WADC ends there. In other words, we need
to make peace with the fact that the world anti-doping
system is currently an asymmetric, diachronic and heter-
archic transnational regulatory ‘‘assemblage’’,229 rather
than a neat hierarchical global regulatory construct.
In this regard, the often-obsessive focus of the media
(and some legal scholars) on WADA and its Code
obfuscate in my view the complex transnational/glocal
geography of the world anti-doping system.230 Interest-
ingly, the CAS has shown a good grasp of this particular
reality in assessing the responsibilities of national SGBs
and athletes in the Russian doping scandal. In any event,
it is time for WADA to be reformed to match the chal-
lenges posed by this peculiar transnational/glocal regula-
tory landscape, and for the SGBs to fully commit to
supporting WADA in doing so. Until now, it seems that
the world anti-doping system has been good at catching
216 See A. Duval, The Russian Doping Scandal at the Court of
Arbitration for Sport: The IPC’s Rio Ineligibility of the Russian
Paralympic Athletes, ASSER International Sports Law Blog, 18
January 2017. http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/the-russian-
doping-scandal-at-the-court-of-arbitration-for-sport-the-ipc-s-rio-inelig
ibility-of-russian-paralympic-athletes. Accessed 25 January 2017.
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poor or poorly advised athletes, unable to rely on the
adequate support to navigate or circumvent the anti-dop-
ing rules and procedures. For example, the many cocaine
cases are a symptom of this tendency to catch the ill-
informed and careless.231 I personally hope the Russian
doping scandal will help to shift the focus towards
enhancing our understanding of the complex operation of
the network of institutions active in the fight against
doping and of their respective responsibilities in ensuring
a doping-free environment.232 This would imply both a
renewed focus on a critical descriptive analysis of the
operation of the system at the local level(s) and from a
normative perspective the willingness to take potential
local shortcomings seriously and, thus, to actively support
the capacity of a weak centre (WADA) in sanctioning
them. Fortunately, in its awards dealing with the Russian
doping scandal, the CAS has shown a willingness to
embrace such an endeavour.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
Amos A, Fridman S (2009) Drugs in sport: the legal issues. Sport Soc
Cult Commer Media Polit 12:356–374
Casini L (2009) Global hybrid public-private bodies: the WADA. Int
Organ Law Rev 6:421–446
DeFrantz AL (2009) Which Rules?: International Sport and Doping in
the 21st Century. Houston J Int Law 31:1–26
Demesley J, Trabal P (2007) De quelques contraintes du processus
d’harmonisation des politiques antidopage (enqueˆte). Terrains &
Travaux 12:138–162
Duval A (2015) Cocaine, doping and the court of arbitration for sport.
Int Sports Law J 15:55–63
Duval A (2016a) Getting to the games: the Olympic selection
drama(s) at the court of arbitration for sport. Int Sports Law J
16:52–66
Duval A (2016b) Tackling doping seriously—reforming the world
anti-doping system after the Russian scandal. Asser Policy Brief
2016–2002
Foschi JK (2006) A constant battle: the evolving challenges in the
international fight against doping in sport. Duke J Comp Int Law
16:457–486
Houlihan B (2002) Managing compliance in international anti-doping
policy: The world anti-doping code. Eur Sport Manag Q
2:188–208
IOC Medical Commission (1999) Report on Harmonisation of
methods and measures in the fight against doping in sport
Kaufmann-Kohler G (2001) Arbitration at the Olympics. Kluwer Law
International, The Hague
Latty F (2007) La lex sportiva: Recherche sur le droit transnational.
Brill, Nijhoff, The Hague
Latty F (2011) Les Re`gles applicables aux relations sportives
transnationales, Le regard de l’internationaliste publiciste. In:
Berge´ J-S et al (eds) La Fragmentation du droit applicable aux
relations internationales, Regards croise´s d’internationalistes
privatistes et publicistes. Pedone, Paris, pp 83–94
Mitten MJ, Opie H (2010) ‘‘Sports law’’: implications for the
development of international, comparative, and national law and
global dispute resolution. Tulane Law Rev 85:269–322
Pound R (1910) Law in books and law in action. Am Law Rev
44:12–36
Sassen S (2006) Territory–authority–rights: from medieval to global
assemblages. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Soule´ B, Lestrelin L (2012) Re´guler le dopage? Les failles de la
gouvernance sportive « L’affaire Puerto » comme illustration.
Revue europe´enne des sciences sociales 50:127–151
Vidar Hanstad D, Skille EA˚, Loland S (2010) Harmonization of anti-
doping work: myth or reality? Sport Soc Cult Commer Media
Politics 13:418–430
Wagner U (2011) Towards the construction of the world anti-doping
agency: analyzing the approaches of FIFA and the IAAF to
doping in sport. Eur Sport Manag Q 11:445–470
231 See the CAS’ cocaine cases reviewed in Duval (2015).
232 Already in favour of such a shift, see Demesley and Trabal
(2007), p. 160.
Int Sports Law J
123
